By: Walid Ertima*
This article starts from the premise that Libyan dialogue, the resulting agreement project and the suggested Government of
National Accord, are initially the project of the international community, western and regional powers, and secondly a project for most of Libyans, it ignores raised clamor around the former UN envoy to Libya, Bernardino Leon and his employment in the UAE, regarding that it is only secondary matter related to Leon himself that won’t affect the path of dialogue nor in its outputs.
It is clear today that the crisis in Libya is not “legitimate crisis” nor labels or classifications. It is not crisis of “outgoing or dissolved” as the political reality hasn’t changed after constitutional court’s provision to dissolve the House of Representatives (HoR), and it won’t change after 20/10/2015; because the problem in Libya is simply a complicated political problem, all its parties are suffering issues and problems within themselves and their political and military opponents at the same time.
Government of political dialogue:
No rave, rift and disagreement between parties to the political crisis in Libya is getting bigger with every new given shows on the scenes, a good example is: the disintegration of Libya Dawn alliance after some armed revolutionary formations made reconciliation agreements in south and western Libya, and when the Libyan dialogue entered new developed stages and when Khlifa Haftar stumbled militarily in the east.
Such givens and developments acted as political motivation for the course of the political dialogue which resulted in Fayez Al-Sarraj’s government in the past few weeks.
In this article, I am trying to answer all questions Libyans have about the Government of National Accord (GNA): its members, its fortunes with the General National Congress (GNC) and the HoR?
Government for consensus
Such description is the most accurate one we can use to call the government suggested by Leon, before his departure for job offer in the UAE. The configuration of the government, specially its effective members in the presidential council, guarantees its diversity, its social, political, diplomatic, financial backgrounds and the nature of its influential; and saves it from leaning towards non-compromising solutions.
Al-Sarraj belongs to a known Tripolitanian family, and he is an engineer, a member of the HoR for Tripoli, was one of Meitig squad that was challenged constitutionally, and worked at the office of presidency of the government under Ali Zidan, but I want to say that Al-Sarraj will not be partisan nor illogical in this post.
“Tripolitanian person” couldn’t be a precise expression, sociologically, as it carries uncontrolled characteristics on scientific measures, nor agreement, but I couldn’t find another term to declare my point in which I mean that Tripolitanian, by nature prefer quite life with no ideological indifferences that brings more conflict.
A businessman with Misratan roots, lives in Tripoli, was named as the Prime Minister in controversial session, which was ruled as unconstitutional, based on provision of the constitutional court. Since then, Meitig started his political career, one day before the court’s rule not the day he accepted the presidency of the government; he is Misratan for most of Libyans and Tripolitanian for most of Misratans.
Almagbary roots go back to Al-Wahat area, prominent academic and economist lived between Ajdabiya and Benghazi, his presence in this post is strengthen by his family connections at those areas. Also, Almagbary’s presence is the formation could enable him to wave alliances to ensure the flow of oil from Al-Brega fields.
The son of Al-Kouni Belkani Al-Tareqy, prominent, highly consensual person in Libya specially in the south. He was the Libyan consulate in Mali, specifically in Kidally then in Bamako where he succeeded in driving reconciliation efforts to a peace agreement between the central government in the financial Bamako and Tuaregs in northern Mali, and succeeded in reaching a similar agreement between the Tuareg and the Niger government.
Those characters, with existence of Mohamed Alamary, the member of GNC, who showed obvious political skills, and Omar Al-Aswad from Zintan, a well practitioner in administrative field, with the possibility of adding third minister from Benghazi and two personals from the south, make the presidential council geographically and politically balanced, as it gathered diaspora of political Libyan crisis in one ministerial council that will lead new political phase not related to the previous one that resulted in this government.
With the presence of highly optimistic atmosphere among Libyans, some challenges still face the government until it begins its work from Tripoli. Most observants are aware of such challenges and obstacles in front of the government which was oversaw and mediated by the international community with unprecedented support.
Two fractured camps
With the government, its formation and characteristics, the two shrouded camps, who stand behind it, are suffering horizontal and vertical cracks, that, no doubt, will harden the ratification of the government at the beginning. But such cracks could turn into points of strength if the government appeared coherent in a vicinity dominated by fragmentation, then each party will find the government as his sole strength and main conflict point with the other side, which could make its members truly “Men of the Nation” if they could manage all differences of their supports in the sake of their assigned responsibilities.
Then the government would be the center where all visions and solutions are gathered, not a dumber where differences and fragmentations. Then it will be more powerful than the HoR, the GNC, brigades, tribal men and parties; and thus leads all sides toward solutions and patriotic challenge, and In all cases, liberate itself from their differences, internal conflicts, and their great struggle in the camps of dawn and dignity. There is nothing wrong here to look at the two big titles of the equation and its fractures:
The GNC in Tripoli
The configuration of the GNC was hit by two big blows that fragmented the already unassembled remnants of political alliances produced by the operation of Libya Dawn.
First blow: when it couldn’t keep up with revolutionaries’ desire to end fighting in western Libya. The GNC, instead of being at the forehead of reconciliation process with Almagarha and Wersheffana, part of it preferred to move forward with war leaving undeniable political and military division.
Second blow: when the political dialogue was moving forward with initial signing, last July, to Abdulrahman Al-Swehly joining the dialogue envoy.
Developments in the political dialogue made important block inside the GNC that sees that the dialogue is the only solution to the Libyan crisis, even though this block is still fragile, it is still capable of easily pass the government.
The HoR in Tobruq
The division was obvious inside the HoR since the beginning of its sessions. Its political formation ignored ideologies gravitations leaving the scene for tribal and vocal differences. But the representative envoy in dialogue sessions managed to marginalized the internal political statues away from the dialogue course.
Will the HoR grant confidence to the government? Fortunes are still high that the HoR will grant confident to Al-Sarraj’s government. With the presence of big Tripolitanian block inside the HoR, beside the inclusion of Almagbary who is supported from Barqa, and obvious agreement in the south on Alkouni, and the fear among all members of “vacuum scenarios” after 20/10, I can say that the HoR will certainly approve the government.
Generally, the form of the HoR will not change, unless it adopted the agreement and boycotting members returned to the Council, what would impose a new political reality and paints a completely different form.
Libya is heading towards entirely new phase separated from the previous one; as “Libya today” has passed Libya Dawn and Dignity, equation of revolution and counter revolution is over. “Libya today” faces extremism, economic stagnation and absence of the state. So in this stage we need to change our readings of the events to actually get to a realistic diagnosis of the crisis.
*A Libyan Writer
Translated By LIBYAPROSPECT: Source