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Libyan Conflict to the Beat of the “UN Game”

A girl in Benghazi with a placard saying that the Libyan tribes are united, on 23 February 2011. Wikipedia



Algerian MP of the leftist “Social Forces Front” Arezki DerguiniAl Arezki Derguini stressed in an article published by the American Huffington Post new site in its Moroccan version in French, published on the first of July entitled “This is the Game in Libya”, that the ongoing war in Libya is connected to the international relations game arising from the desire to control the Libyan wealth and influence the various disputing parties in the country.

Derguini believes that the main reason that prompted the international forces to topple the Gadhafi regime was the desire to benefit from the Libyan resources, as the Gadhafi regime was the sole controller of them. As soon as it was toppled, the internal forces in Libya and the international forces entered into a heated struggle to secure their share.

The Algerian MP added that the current situation in Libya is represented by the rise of new parties that seek new uses for Libyan resources, and anticipated that the Libyan war will continue in the form of failing to reach an agreement that leads to the division of this Libyan wealth among various local and international forces.

Derguini stressed that the international forces depict the Libyan conflict to the public opinion as having ideological references, to convince their communities that the public interests of their countries are threatened by enemy forces in Libya. This aims to place the Libyan wealth in the service of the public interests of these forces.

He added that the media of these international forces are working in the same trenches as the regimes to create a public opinion that is supportive of the government’s options, by depicting them as serving public interests (specifically security interests), as well as the private interests of the political parties, banks and major companies.

Internally, Libya is living to the beat of a conflict between the powers and the social sensitivities over the Libyan wealth. Each party seeks to secure the necessary means to control the land and the resources.

However, the difference between the internal and the external conflict in Libya is that the internal forces do not seek to serve public interests, but rather clash among each other to serve their narrow interests and the interests of their parties. The matter here does not pertain to the Muslims or the seculars, but rather pertains to the interests, the revolution, the negotiation weapons (tribe and city), international recognition and foreign relations.

Derguini stresses that the media that forms the public opinion does not prioritize covering the real negotiation, sufficing with a focus on the state of chaos in Libya, giving consumers of the media material a choice between chaos and the UN plan to resolve the Libyan crisis. The Libyan people are depicted as unable to form a strong government, where the only solution is international supervision to regain control over matters in Libya.

He believes that the real problem in Libya is that the Libyans will be able to find a solution when they feel their interests are threatened. This is confirmed, in the author’s opinion, by flaws in the public opinion’s view of the situation in Libya, due to the “public interests” “lie” of the governments and the media, especially since the foreign forces do not wish to consult the Libyan parties with regard to resolving the crisis, preferring to impose their visions on them.

The Algerian MP stressed that the chaos in Libya was not created by the Libyans, it was created by an earlier situation where interests were intertwined. The Libyan people’s sovereignty was taken away and a better climate for imposing interests was created. The rejectionist Libyan forces will be threatened to cooperate because Libya remains under the control of UN decisions or more cooperative new partners will be sought in Libya.

Derguini refers to the Sudanese example, where the Sudanese President’s refusal to cooperate with the international forces led to the creation of new partners in the south of the country, which eventually led to the country’s division.

The Algerian leftist activist believes that the UN and foreign forces pressure to form a “friendly” central power in Libya that is acceptable to the Libyan society means that Libya has a friendly power that controls the natural wealth of the country. The author attributed the continuation of the current internal and international balances in Libya to the inability of various parties to reach an agreement on an appropriate form of the division of power that protects the terms and interests of each.


Derguini believes that the local and tribal groups in Libya do not want to leave the “legitimate violence of the state” in the hands of one group with international immunity. The same situation prevailed in Europe in the 17th century, where European princes disputed over power and land. This is the same situation today in Libya among the various armed groups.

The author estimates that the armed groups in Libya today refuse to hand over their weapons for fear of losing influence and wealth. They consider that the idea of forming a regular army according to the requirements of the “state of law” will revert them back to the Gadhafi regime without Gadhafi, and everyone will be under the control of a central authority that monopolizes decision making.

Derguini summarizes that the foreign intervention in Libya initiated a complex conflict in a society that still lives to the beat of the post-colonial era, as the division of the Libyan society is divided into poles without any sense of complementarity among them. This situation cannot be tolerated in view of the currently prevailing system of international relations.

Derguini likens what happened in Libya after the fall of Gadhafi to what a number of countries went through following the end of the colonial era and the difficulties they faced in establishing a legitimate power and a strong regime.

The author adds that the currently negotiating disputing parties in Libya have no local partners in Libya or unchallenged legitimacy. They also do not have the ability to establish a real authority in Libya. At the same time, they refuse to accept a political regime that they do not benefit from, in addition to refusing a product that they do not participate in. However, the deteriorating economic situation in Libya, in view of the collapse of the state institutions over the past few years, may prompt various parties to accept middle ground solutions to save their surviving interests.

Derguini stresses that imposing a democratic regime on a country that does not believe in Western principles and that lived for about half a century under the rule of a backward regime will have no results. He believes that democratizing society, building the infrastructure of the authorities and developing national loyalty in Libya similar to the European model based on the idea of the “nation state” must precede any other action.


Derguini attributes the failure of most Arab revolutions to achieve their goals to a discrepancy between the hopes hung on the revolution and the absence of a sense of citizenship in most Arab communities, in addition to a weakness in building alternate authorities and the lack of balance between the components of the civil society and the parties controlling actual powers.

The Algerian MP stresses that the Western public opinion was programmed on the basis of the transformation of the Arab spring to an Islamic winter, to divert attention from the transformation in the region and maintain the interests of the international community in their relations with the new authorities.

Derguini adds that the international forces cannot accept a Libyan society that is involved in power. Moreover, the presence of local powers that establish a balanced regime guarantees their share of the wealth and protects the interests of the various areas.

Derguini concludes by saying that the international forces want to maintain in Libya a model of a “post-colonial state” through the desire to establish a “state of law and institutions” tailored to their interests, and not on the basis of the interests of Libyans and their future.



Source: as referred to by almarsad alliby.